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The Dynamics of Excessive Force
DariaRoithmayrt

ABSTRACT
Existing scholarship suggests that police use of excessive force will be greatest in
departments with "bad apple" officers or bad top-down incentive structures. This
paper proposes an alternative theoretical account to argue that patterns of
excessive force dynamically emerge from local interactions among individuals that
aggregate to form more global patterns of escalation, contagion, and decay. I focus
on two dynamic interactions in particular. First, I argue that excessive force
spreads and escalates by way of a self-reinforcingarms race between civilians and
officers that intensifies the use of excessive force over time. As officers use excessive
force, civilians in a community become less deferential and more resistant;in turn,
as civilians become less deferential and more resistant, officers use more excessive
force. Race shapes this process-black civilians are more likely to be perceived as
non-deferential, and the arms race becomes more likely in black communities.
Second, I argue that excessive force contagiously spreads among officers in the
same network, as officers learn from each other how and when to use excessive
force against defiant civilians. When officers observe others in their network using
excessive force, they become more likely to use excessive force in later encounters.
This theoretical account suggests that any department could be vulnerable to a
surge in the use of excessive force, given the right initial conditions.

I. INTRODUCTION

Recent events in Ferguson, New York City, Cleveland, Charleston,
and Chicago have highlighted a troubling fact. Even as violent crime
rates have dropped dramatically across the country,' police use of
excessive force has become increasingly visible, particularly police
shootings against unarmed members of the African American and
Latino communities. The shooting of unarmed civilians, the
indiscriminate use of stop and frisk, excessive force, and degrading and
humiliating treatment are now all highly visible, thanks to cellphone

t George T. and Harriet E. Pfleger Professor of Law at the University of Southern California
Gould School of Law.
1 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Summary for 2014,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (national rate of violent crime has decreased for twelve years in a row).
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cameras. Social media and subsequent government and civil rights
organization investigations also help to uncover abuse that historically
has gone unreported. 2
Although reliable data is limited, the data that does exist indicate
that police use of excessive force is relatively rare and highly uneven
across time and space.3 Consistent with this unevenness, reports
indicate that rates of excessive force appear quite hard to explain in
any systematic way. 4 Size does not appear to explain much. Some large
urban police departments experience relatively high rates of excessive
force while others report far lower rates. For example, departments in
Albuquerque, Cleveland, and New York have been investigated by the
U.S. Department of Justice for a range of abuses including excessive
force. 5 Other large urban departments, like the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD), seem at least for the moment to have successfully
reduced their rates of excessive force, although Los Angeles has
experienced spikes during particular years.6 Some small municipalities
like Ferguson experience high rates of force, while others do not.'
According to the literature, excessive force can be traced to one of
three primary sources: (i) the personality traits or attitudes of
individual police officers, or their demographic profiles; (ii) the topdown organizational incentive structures of individual police
departments; or (iii) the racial and class biases of officers, which get
triggered in particular interactions between police and civilians with
particular demographic profiles. 8 The oldest and most classic literature
on excessive force falls into the first category, the "bad apples" theory,
but all three theories focus on the characteristics of individual officers

2 See Oliver Laughlin & John Swaine, What Happens to Americans Who Film Police
Violence, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2015, 7:43 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/
15/filming-police-violence-walter-scott-michael-brown-shooting [https://perma.cc/68P4-PRCE].
See id. and accompanying text.
Christopher J. Harris, Police Use of ImproperForce: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 4
VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 25 (2009) (discussing results of a systematic study on excessive force by
police, and indicating the limitations of the study).
' Mitch Smith & Matt Apuzzo, Cleveland Reaches Settlement with Justice Department over
Police Conduct, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2015 at Al.
6 According to data compiled by journalists investigating LAPD shootings, police shootings
varied significantly over the past five years: seventy-two shootings in 2010, ninety-four in 2011,
eighty-five in 2012, ninety-two in 2013, and thirty-two in 2014. KPCC Officer Involved Project,
http: /projects.sepr.org/officer-involvedlexplore/ [https://perma.cc/RTK8-M4JA].
Many scholars argue that smaller departments, because of their size, are less likely to
experience high rates of police brutality or excessive force. See Robert E. Worden, The Causes of
Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence on Police Use of Force, in JUSTICE FOR ALL:

UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 37-46 (William A. Geller & Hans

Toch eds., 1996).
" See infra Part II.
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or individual organizations' incentive structures. Empirically, based on
these theories, we should expect to see excessive force in departments
with bad apples or bad incentive structures. Unhappily, there is little
empirical research to support such predictions.9
In contrast to the literature on police, scholars studying gangs have
developed cutting edge methods to investigate the dynamics of
violence.10 Scholars in this field have begun to use modern methods,
including dynamic social network analysis, to suggest that gang
violence is very much a social phenomenon and is heavily influenced by
social ties among gang members." For example, recent scholarship
maps the way in which violent events cluster among a relatively small
group of gang members, suggesting that network relationships among
individuals create channels for the spread of retaliatory violence. 12
Drawing from such research, this paper offers a supplemental
theoretical account that focuses on the dynamic spread of excessive
force over time and space. Here, the argument focuses less on
individual actors or organizations and more on the dynamic patterns of
escalation and contagion that can emerge at the level of the collective
from local interactions among officers and civilians. More specifically, I
focus on two dynamic patterns in particular: (i) a self-reinforcing "arms
race" between civilians and officers that reproduces and potentially
escalates the use of excessive force over time; and (ii) a contagion in
which excessive force spreads among officers in the same network, as
officers learn from each other how and when to use excessive force.
Each of these dynamics facilitates the spread of excessive force
over time and space. First, excessive force spreads vertically (meaning
over time), by way of a self-reinforcing arms race between police and
civilians that involves the relationship between excessive force by police
and increased defiance by civilians. Research documents that civilians
are more likely to become resistant and defiant when police use
excessive force against them or others in their community. More
specifically, members of communities who are the victims of police
abuse (or who have witnessed or learned of instances of abuse within
9
'0

See id.
See infra Part III and IV.

"

See MICHAEL WARR, COMPANIONS IN CRIME: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT

(2002); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Social Contagion of Violence, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND AGGRESSION 688, 691 (Daniel J. Flannery, Alexander T. Vazsonyi & Irwin

D. Waldman eds., Cambridge 2007) [hereinafter "THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK]; Albert J. Reiss, Jr.,
Co-Offending and Criminal Careers, in 10 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH (Michael

Tonry & Norval Morris eds., Univ. Chi. Press 1988).
2 See, e.g., Andrew V. Papachristos et al., The Corner and
the Crew: The Influence of
Geography and Social Networks on Gang Violence, 78 AMER. Soc. REV. 417, 438-39 (2013). This
work is discussed in more depth infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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their community) become less likely to defer to rules of authority in
their encounters with police, and more likely to evince resistance. A
separate thread of research finds that police are more likely to use
excessive force against civilians who refuse to defer, are defiant, or are
resistant. 13 This paper brings together these separate threads of
research to argue that excessive force escalates in a positive feedback
loop, as each side triggers an escalating response in the other.
Importantly, as the discussion below illuminates in more detail,
race is an engine that fuels this process. Research shows that officers
are more likely to perceive that black civilians are defiant or resistant,
and are therefore more likely to use excessive force against black
civilians, even when they are not exhibiting signs of defiance or
resistance. This in turn makes it more likely that black civilians will in
fact be defiant. Some research also suggests that officers may be more
likely to use excessive force in the days immediately after an encounter
with a resistant black civilian, in encounters with other black

civilians.14
Second, excessive force also spreads horizontally (meaning through
geographic and social space) like a virus, propagating along the social
networks of a department via social learning. What spreads from officer
to officer is the use of a particular strategy or sequence of behavior
involving the use of excessive force. Officers who observe other police
officers use excessive force against a defiant civilian will become more
likely to use excessive force in future encounters with a defiant civilian,
particularly if the force they witness produces some positive payoff for
the perpetrator. If officers perceive that using excessive force is a more
effective way to reduce the length of an encounter and the risk of
violence, or if officers reward each other with approval when they use
such force, excessive force strategies will spread. Each new incident of
excessive force potentially increases the probability of future excessive
15
force, and the strategy of excessive force diffuses over time.
Both dynamics focus on the way in which violence spreads in a
police force. Contagion spreads violence from officer to officer.
Escalation spreads violence from officer generation to officer
generation, along a timeline. Whatever the source for the initial spark
of an excessive force event, these dynamic processes transmit and
16
amplify the effect of that event across time and space.

1
14

15

See infra Part III.
See id.
See infra Part IV.

In theoretical treatments of contagion, the initiating event is ordinarily framed in the
context of what theorists call the background rate. Background rates serve to distinguish events
16
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Escalation and contagion do not continue indefinitely. Hotspots can
decay and epidemics can lose their force, owing to the passage of time.
Just as the risk of aftershock after an earthquake decays over time, the
heightened probability that an officer will use excessive force after
observing another officer use it or after being subject to civilian
defiance decays over time, as the immediacy and memory of the event
decay." Understanding the dynamics of this amplification and decay is
essential for policymakers who aim to curb police abuse.
This analysis of the contagion of police violence draws from work in
population ecology, epidemiology, and economic geography. In these
disciplines and others, researchers map the dynamic patterns of
infectious disease and economic phenomena (like competition and
growth) that emerge from individual interactions.' 8 The focus of their
work is less on originating events and more on the dynamic spread of a
phenomenon-of pathogens or economic strategies, for example.
In the same way that an epidemiologist can map the escalation and
spread of an epidemic, one can geographically map the dynamic spread
of excessive force, both over time and space. In future work, this project
will analyze longitudinal data from the Chicago Police Department to
generate a hotspots map that traces the evolutionary dynamics of
excessive force during the years for which we have available data. The
rise and fall of excessive force can be analyzed quantitatively, to
understand existing hotspots of excessive force, and to predict the
formation of new hotspots and the decay of old ones, to the extent that
such processes are predictable. An evolutionary dynamics model, of
excessive force can also generate new hypotheses using these maps as a
theoretical starting point.
This essay is organized as follows. Part II reviews existing research
on the causes of excessive force. Part III explores the argument that
that arise owing to contagion from events that arise due to some other non-contagion source. See,
e.g., George Mohler, Modeling and Estimation of Multi-Source Clustering in Crime and Security

Data, 7 ANN. APPL. STAT. 1525 (2013).
"

For more on earthquake decay formulas, see Tokushi Utsu et al., The Centenary of the

Omori Formulafor a Decay Law of Aftershock Activity, 43 J. PHYS. EARTH 1 (1995).
"' For work in the field of economic geography, see BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND
PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994); Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic

Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483, 484-98 (1991). For work in which researchers map the
evolutionary dynamics of economic geography in firm location, see Bottazzo et al., On the
Ubiquitous Nature of Agglomeration Economies and Their Diverse Determinants: Some Notes, in
COMPLEXITY AND INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS: DYNAMICS AND MODELS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 167-86

(A. Curzio & M. Fortis eds., 2002). For work in which scholars map the spread of infectious disease
by tracing the evolutionary dynamics of transmission, see Massimo Cicozzi et al., Evolutionary
Dynamics of HBV-D1 Genotype Epidemic in Turkey, 86 J. MEDICAL VIROLOGY 109, 109-16 (2013).
See also Armen Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211, 21119 (1950) (arguing that population dynamics models effectively describe the evolution of human
behavior in the economy under conditions of uncertainty).
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excessive force escalates in the context of group conflict between police
and civilians, escalating as police abuse civilians and then as civilians
in turn defy and disrespect police. In Part IV, the paper reviews
research on social learning and violence, to suggest that excessive force
propagates like a virus from officer to officer by way of observational
learning. Part V concludes, describing the data available from Chicago's
Police Accountability Project and future plans for generating a hotspots
map.
II. EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE
Excessive force is defined as force that exceeds what is objectively
reasonable and necessary under the circumstances for an officer to
subdue or control a person. 19 Research indicates that although police
use of excessive force is rare relative to the number of encounters
between police and civilians, half a million people annually experience
some form of excessive force. 20
Existing scholarship focuses on one of three potential causes of
excessive force: (i) individual traits of police officers, (ii) organizational
configurations of police departments, or (iii) the race and gender
dynamics of interactions between officers and the victims of police
brutality. Each theoretical explanation and its accompanying empirical
literature are considered in turn.

A.

Individual Officer Traits

Most of the historical research on excessive force, which comes
from sociology and criminology, has focused on the features of
individual officers. This literature attributes excessive force to so-called
"bad apples" who possess deviant personality traits or attitudes. A wide
range of scholars have suggested that some officers are predisposed to
violence because of "authoritarian" or "dominating" personalities,
although it is not clear from research whether candidates are attracted

"0 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-99 (1989); see also Shielded from Justice: Police
Brutality and Accountability in the United States, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH n.1 (1998),
(citing
[https://perma.cc/LN7G-FFJV]
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspol4.htm
Article 3 of the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials).
20 A
periodic interview-based survey of 60,000 respondents, conducted by the U.S.
Department of Justice, found that only 16.9% of respondents aged 16 or older had face-to-face
contact with police. Of these, 1.4% (which would be a projected 574,000 in the U.S. population)
said they had force "threatened or used against them" during their most recent contact. MATTHEW
DUROSE & CHRISTINE EITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC,

2008, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT 12 (2011). Of this group, 76% complained of
improper treatment, and 74.3% believed the force was "excessive" (projected to be about 517,000
persons). Id. at 13-14.
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to policing because they have pre-existing authoritarian personalities,
or the experience of policing develops those attitudes and traits (or
both). 21
For example, one such study traced excessive force to "tough cops,"
which the study defined as those officers who presume that police are
meant to intervene negatively to control a hostile citizenry. 22
Researchers relied on survey research to correlate officer attitudes on
the use of force with other more general views of the relationship
between police and civilians. The study suggested that officers most
likely to use improper force are those who believe in maximum police
discretion to carry out the job of fighting crime, doing battle with
civilians who are unappreciative at best and hostile at worst. 2 3
Such theories enjoy widespread acceptance among the public and
policymakers, empirical research produces weak support at best for the
bad apples hypothesis. 24 Studies have found no consistent link between
attitudes or personality traits like "tough cops" and actual officer
behavior. More generally, attitudes are weakly correlated to officers'
actions across a range of circumstances. 2 5 Most contemporary scholars
now dismiss the bad apples theory as unsupported. 26
In a related vein of research that springs from the bad apples
hypothesis, some scholars argue that officer age, gender, and arrest
activity may be linked to the use of excessive force: younger officers are
more likely to be the subject of civilian complaints. 27 Likewise, scholars
have suggested that excessive force can be linked to a lack of a college
education, race (black officers are more often linked to excessive force
than white), or gender. 28

21 See THEODOR W. ADORNO, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY
(1950); Hans Toch, The
Violence Prone Police Officer, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE

ABUSE OF FORCE 94-113 (William Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996); see also LINDSAY J. TURNER,
POLICE PERSONALITY:

A COMPARATIVE

ANALYSIS

OF AUTHORITARIANISM,

AGGRESSION,

AND

CYNICISM 47-56 (2003); Nancy Cochran, Authority Orientations of Police Officers, 60 J. APPL.
PSYCHOL. 641, 642-43 (1975).
22 See Worden, supra note 7, at 26.
23

See id. at 27; see also WARREN CHRISTOPHER, REPORT OF THE INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A.

POLICE DEP'T (1991) (hereinafter "Christopher Commission").
24
Citing to bad apples theorists, the Christopher Commission's investigation
of the Los
Angeles Police Department traced misuse of force in the department to a small number of

"problem officers." See id.
25
See Brad W. Smith & Malcolm D. Holmes, Community Accountability, Minority Threat and
Police Brutality: An Examination of Civil Rights Criminal Complaints, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1035,
1048-57 (2003) (hereinafter "Community Accountability"); Worden, supra note 7, at 27-28.
26
See Worden, supra note 7, at 27-28.
" See James P. McElvain & Augustine Kposowa, Police Officer Characteristicsand Internal
Affairs Investigationsfor Use of Force Allegations, 32 J. CRIM. JUST. 265, 276-77 (2004).
28

See Steven G. Brand1 et al., Who Are the Complaint-ProneOfficers? An Examination of the

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

414

[ 2016

But again, more recent scholarship suggests that the links between
demographic traits and actual behavior are more likely explained by
omitted variables. 29 For example, the research finding that black
officers are more likely to use force on duty or off duty may in fact be a
function of duty assignments or the neighborhoods in which an officer
chooses to live or spend time. 30 The variable of duty assignment, which
can be correlated with officer traits like experience and age, potentially
confounds empirical support for studies that focus on traits and
attitudes.
Organizational Incentives and Culture

B.

Some scholars try to trace excessive force by officers back to the
top-down incentive structures of the individual organizations in which
they work-the department or unit's organizational DNA, so to speak.
Here, scholars argue that particular rewards, punishments, and
organizational practices determine whether officers engage in excessive
force. For example, the Christopher Commission concluded that
departmental rewards for high arrest numbers, light sanctions for
improper use of force, and complicated civilian complaint procedures
contributed to an organizational culture that encouraged the use of
excessive force in the LAPD. 3 1
Some support for this view comes from studies on the effect of
organizational interventions (primarily on the effect of changing rules)
on changing rates of misuse of force. For example, in 1972, the city of
New York established a restrictive policy on the employment of deadly
force, limiting its use to situations in which there was a clear threat to
the life of the officer or another human being. 32 James Fyfe found that
the policy effectively reduced the weekly mean number of firearm
discharges by twenty-nine percent. 33 Although the research is dated,
the finding suggests that changing organizational policy can affect
rates of excessive force.

Relationship Between Police Officers' Attributes, Arrest Activity, Assignment, and Citizens'
ComplaintsAbout Excessive Force, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 521, 527-28 (2001).
See Sean A. Grennan, Findings on the Role of Officer Gender in Violent Encounters with
2
Citizens, 15 POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 1, 83-84 (1987); Worden, supra note 7, at 23-48.
" See Hoon Lee et al., The Impact of Neighborhood Crime Levels on Police Use of Force: An
Examination at Micro and Meso Levels, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 491 (2014); see also Worden, supra note
7, at 28.
" See Christopher Commission, supra note 23.
32
See James J. Fyfe, Administrative Interventionon Police Shooting Discretion:An Empirical
Examination, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 309, 313-22 (1979).
u

See id.
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Beyond indirect evidence, however, the support for this hypothesis
is sparse. Proper organizational analysis is expensive and timeconsuming and researchers find it difficult to distinguish between
occupational culture and organizational culture. 34 More generally,
scholars find it difficult to casually link top-down structural incentives
to cultural attitudes or behaviors at the ground level; omitted variables
are a significant problem here as elsewhere, and top-down policies vary
in their effect on bottom-up behavior. Notably, the so-called "code of
silence" among officers frequently interacts with top-down incentives to
produce varying reactions to those incentives. 3 5
C.

Identity-Focused Dynamics Between Police and Civilians

A third approach to explaining excessive force centers on the social
(and mostly racial) interactions between officers and civilians. In this
literature, scholars argue that the class, race, and gender stereotypes of
officers and civilians explain the behavior of police. On this view,
excessive force is a product of officer bias against people of color, young
men in particular, and the poor and working class.
Empirical support for this theory is mixed. A number of studies
find that officers use deadly force disproportionately against civilians
who are African American or Latino, 36 or in disadvantaged urban
neighborhoods. 37 Ascertaining the cause of this disparity is more
difficult. It seems uncontroversial that police officers are subject to the
same kinds of stereotyping and implicit biases as those to which
civilians are subject. 38 In addition, those biases are likely heightened in
the context of disadvantaged neighborhoods. At the same time, other
literature suggests that police may discriminate against minority
citizens in predominantly white neighborhoods to "defend" them from
minorities who are perceived as criminal threats. 39

3

See Worden, supra note 7, at 30.

"

See id. at 30-31.

6 See id. at 30; see also Malcolm D. Holmes, Minority Threat and Police Brutality:
Determinants of Civil Rights Criminal Complaints in U.S. Municipalities, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 343,
354-61 (2000); Community Accountability, supra note 25, at 93-98.
" See Malcolm D. Holmes & Brad W. Smith, Intergroup Dynamics of Extra-Legal Police
Aggression: An Integrated Theory of Race and Place, 17 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAV. 344,

345 (2012).
" See Robert J. Kane, The Social Ecology of Police Misconduct, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 867, 887-88
(2002); Michael R. Smith & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Explaining Police Bias: A Theory of Social
Conditioningand Illusory Correlation, 34 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV., 1262, 1269-74 (2007).
3
See Eric A. Stewart et al., Neighborhood Racial Context and Perceptions of Police-Based
Racial DiscriminationAmong Black Youth, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 847, 855, 870-75 (2009).
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The foregoing discussion explores a number of hypotheses about
the cause of excessive force. Among contemporary empiricists, the
scholarly consensus is that none of these hypotheses alone sufficiently
40
explains the source of excessive force, for reasons explored above. In
the next section, I develop an account of excessive force that focuses
less on individual traits of officers and organizations, and more on the
dynamic interactions among police and civilians. In this analysis, the
relevant unit of analysis is the interactive relationship-the link that
connects officers with each other and with the civilians they police. My
argument suggests that excessive force is generated as a product of
those interactions, and that any officer in any department is potentially
vulnerable to emergent excessive force given a particular set of
interactive relationships.
This account draws on a modern shift in the literature on culture,
one that moves away from seeing culture as a set of attitudes toward
seeing culture as a set of particular behaviors and actions, what some
call a "culture in action" model.4 1 In these new models, the focus is on
"toolkits" of strategies that people deploy in particular interactions with
others and in particular environmental settings. The dynamic account
that follows focuses very specifically on the toolkit of strategies that
officers deploy in the face of resistant or defiant civilians, and on the
way in which using the tools of excessive force can trigger an arms race
between civilians and officers, and a contagion of force among officers.
III. ESCALATION: AN ARMS RACE BETWEEN OFFICERS
AND CIVILIANS

The next two sections draw on more recent research to develop a
dynamic account of excessive force that focuses on escalation and
contagion. This section argues that excessive force emerges and
intensifies in an arms race that escalates excessive force in the conflict
between civilians and police. The next section discusses the idea that
excessive force spreads via social learning among officers.
The argument for an escalating arms race between officers and
civilians can be briefly summarized as follows. In higher-crime locales,
police and civilians are engaged in sustained group conflict over control,
in much the same way that gangs engage in conflict over control and
turf. In this context, police are more likely to engage in excessive force
when civilians defy their authority or are otherwise resistant to police
See Worden, supra note 7, at 46-48.
4
See Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AMER. Soc. REV. 273, 27374 (1986).
40
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control in a particular encounter. In turn, the use of excessive force

makes it more likely (for some period of time after the event) that
civilians will defy or resist police authority in future encounters. This
increase in resistance may be particularly true for members of
communities of color in disadvantaged neighborhoods, who are
disproportionately victims of excessive force, or who witness or hear
about the use of excessive force in their communities. The following
discussion develops this argument more fully.
A.

The Background Role of Group Conflict

The use of excessive force by police against civilians takes place
against the backdrop of a more general conflict between the two groups.
A brief review of group conflict theory illuminates the contextual role
that group conflict, and a strongly salient group identity, can play in
excessive force dynamics.
Realistic group conflict theory investigates the dynamics of conflict
between groups over resources, status, political power, or opportunity. 42
Among the central claims of the theory, scholars suggest that groups in
conflict develop close bonds in which they favor each other, and often
develop hostility toward out-group members, demonizing them in
stereotyped ways. Studies have documented the way in which group
members minimize differences among members in order to promote ingroup favoritism, and likewise, exaggerate differences between group
members to justify their hostility toward out-group members. 43
Scholars have only recently begun to use "realistic group conflict"
to understand and explain the persistence of police use of excessive
force. 4 4 Drawing from realistic conflict definitions of group identity,
some scholars note that police group identity is defined in large part by
the conflict between police and civilians over social control of
geographically and racially defined communities.4 5
As researchers note, group conflict literature documents the way in
which groups exaggerate the differences between group members and
describe out-group members as threatening, in order to justify
perpetuating the conflict. In the case of police versus civilians, this
understanding of threat has some basis in reality. Officers patrol their
42

For a comprehensive overview of work on realistic group conflict theory,
see Roy F.

Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs, Realistic Group Conflict Theory, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Soc.

PSYCHOL. 725, 725-26 (2007).
* See id.
44
See Holmes & Smith, Intergroup Dynamics of Extra-Legal Police Aggression, supra note 37,
at 347.
" See id.
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beats confronting not just symbolic, but actual threats to their safety
and ability to exert social control. Both real and symbolic threats
activate the salience of the police identity, and in turn, in-group
solidarity and out-group hostility. 4 6 For example, officers may perceive
civilians with gang tattoos as a threat, thus triggering the in-group
solidarity that draws on the group's identity as police in conflict with
gangs.
More generally,. the literature notes that conflict and threats
enhance group identification and loyalty, the tightening of group
boundaries, and increased out-group hate toward the civilians police
regulate. Conflict with civilians reinforces police officers' bonds to each
other. 47 The "blue wall" of silence, in which officers refuse to testify
against each other, or agree on a fabricated story to protect each other,
shows the power of police solidarity.
Other aspects of police activity help to explain the high salience
that group identity as police has for individual officers. First, the highly
structured organization and training of police officers accentuates their
separateness from the civilian population. 48 Indeed, owing to the nature
of police work, in which police compete with law violators for social
control, police see themselves occupationally not just as separate from,
but also in conflict with, the people they regulate. 49
Second, the racial identity of those with whom police most engage
accentuates group conflict. Here, the argument is less that group
conflict pits white against black, and more that group conflict is
understood as police officers versus black and brown civilians. As noted
earlier, a large body of empirical evidence indicates that police use
greater force, including lethal force, with black and Latino suspects
than with white suspects. 5 0 Data from the U.S. Department of Justice
(2001) indicates that black suspects are approximately four times more
likely than white suspects to die at the hands of a police officer.5 1
Recent research finds that police officers who have served in
districts with a large population, a greater concentration of black
residents, and a high rate of violent crime, are more likely than other
46

See id.; see also MALCOLM D. HOLMES & BRAD SMITH, RACE AND POLICE BRUTALITY: ROOTS

OF AN URBAN DILEMMA 34-35, 119-22 (2008).
See HOLMES & SMITH, RACE AND POLICE BRUTALITY, supranote 46, at 44-48, 52-55.
47

See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE
48
USE OF FORCE 96, 121-22, 134-36, 145, 264 (1993).
4
See JOHN P. CRANK, UNDERSTANDING POLICE CULTURE 61-62 (1998); VICTOR E. KAPPELER
ET AL., FORCES OF DEVIANCE: UNDERSTANDING THE DARK SIDE OF POLICING (2d ed. 1998).

See HOLMES & SMITH, RACE AND POLICE BRUTALITY, supra note 46, at 28-35.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Policing and Homicide, 1976-98: Justifiable Homicide by
Police, Police Officers Murdered by Felons, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (2001).
*
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officers to exhibit racial differences in video-game reaction times. When
asked to decide whether to shoot a civilian with ambiguous objects in
his or her hands, officers are more likely to shoot, and to shoot quickly,
when the civilian is black, although officers' reaction times were better
than civilian members of the community. 52 This research suggests that
racial identity, particularly when coupled with class markers and
geographic location in disadvantaged neighborhoods, accentuates and
intensifies group conflict.
Third, the size of police groups relative to the groups being policed
contributes to group conflict and to the emergence of excessive force. In
general, research suggests that groups that are in the numerical
minority more frequently display in-group favoritism and out-group
hostility, and this effect is even more likely in small groups that
possess a high degree of power. 3 Both of these traits are true of police.
Relative to the rest of the population, police are in the numerical
minority, and the adversarial nature of their relationship to the
population might accentuate officers' perception of being outnumbered.
Police also have relatively more power than the civilians they police.
The existence of group conflict between police and civilians is not
new, but merely serves as the backdrop against which to understand
the dynamics of excessive force. In particular, officers are more
apprehensive and fearful of potential violence from civilians, and are
primed for a more aggressive response to perceived threats.5 4 In
addition, as I will argue in the following section, a highly salient police
group identity makes social learning among officers more likely.
B.

The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Excessive Force

This section argues that excessive force can dynamically reproduce
itself or even intensify over time in a self-reinforcing or escalating arms
race dynamic. In this relationship, civilian resistance and defiance
increase the likelihood of excessive force, and in turn, police use of
excessive force increases the likelihood of civilian resistance and
defiance.
The argument here focuses less on the origin of excessive force, and
more on the escalation that results when violence becomes selfreinforcing. The feedback loop of excessive force might well begin with a
5' See Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the
Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONAL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1020-22 (2007).
" See Itesh Sachdev & Richard Y. Bourhis, Power and Status Differentials in Minority and
Majority Group Relations, 21 EUROPEAN J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 18-22 (1991).
" See Holmes & Smith, Intergroup Dynamics of Extra-LegalPolice Aggression, supra note 37,
at 347.
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"bad apple" officer engaged in excessive force or an officer who
misjudges how much force is necessary to affect an arrest.
Alternatively, the self-reinforcing process might begin from the civilian
end, when a "bad apple" civilian treats an officer with disrespect or
defiance.5 5 Whatever the original spark, excessive force escalates and
persists over time because of a positive feedback loop that connects
defiance and excessive force.
Support for this model of escalation and persistence comes from
two largely separate bodies of research, which the following discussion
reviews in depth. One thread of research finds that police officers are
more likely to engage in excessive force when civilians refuse to defer
56
to, or otherwise openly defy, police authority. Another thread finds
that civilians are more likely to refuse to defer to, and even disrespect
or defy authority, when they themselves or members of their
community have recently been victims of excessive force. For example,
civilians who perceive police to be exercising illegitimate force are more
likely to refuse to follow police directives to lie down, get in the car, or
put their hands in the air.57 This kind of civilian resistance makes it
more likely in turn that police will use excessive force to compel them
to comply. Thus, in this arms race between officers and civilians, police
use of force triggers the refusal to defer, which in turn triggers police
use of force.
Historical and empirical research has documented the existence of
this co-evolutionary relationship in other contexts. Namely, studies
have explored the co-evolutionary cat-and-mouse game between police
and civilian protesters, as civilians innovate to avoid police regulation,
8
The following
and police then adapt to re-regulate civilians.5
race involving
arms
of
an
co-evolution
the
on
discussion focuses
escalating force.

Using the metaphor of forest growth, one team of scholars studying the clustering of
innovative firms in areas like Silicon Valley and Silicon Beach describe the initial "seed" element
as more of a function of chance than deterministic forces. Once individual trees have seeded in a
particular place, population dynamics then determine the evolutionary dynamics of forest growth.
See Richard Pouder & Caron H. St. John, Hot Spots and Blind Spots: Geographical Clusters of
Firms and Innovation, 21 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 1192, 1198 (1996).
* See, e.g., Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Police Disrespect Toward the Public: An EncounterBased Analysis, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 519, 539-45 (2002).
See, e.g., Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Compliance on Demand: The Public's Response to
5
Specific Police Requests, 33 J. OF RES. IN CRIME AND DELINQ. 269, 294-97 (1996).
8 See Donatella Della Porta & Sydney Tarrow, Interactive Diffusion: The Co-Evolution of
Police and Protest Behavior with an Application to TransnationalContention, at 10-34 (presented
at European Consortion for Political Research 2011); Doug McAdam, Tactical Innovation and the
Pace of Insurgency, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 735, 738-52 (1983).
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1. The correlation between civilian defiance or resistance and police
excessive force.
A number of scholars have documented that police use of force is
more likely when a civilian engages in behavior that defies authoritythreatening, attacking, verbally abusing, or fleeing, for example.5 9
Theorists have argued that police use excessive force in the face of a
resistant civilian to retaliate, to preserve social order, or to avert a
potential threat. 60
As an empirical matter, a number of scholars have documented a
correlation between civilian resistance during an encounter and the
increased probability that police will use excessive force during the
same encounter. 61 An observational study of Miami-Dade police officers,
and another in Springfield/Eugene, Oregon, found that a very high
percentage (ninety-seven percent for both Miami and Oregon) of all use
of force cases resulted after a suspect resisted arrest. 62
The probability that an officer will use excessive force evolves
during an encounter. Because this sequence of decisions may be pathdependent, events during the early phases of an encounter can
disproportionately affect the future probability of force. Accordingly, a
civilian's refusal to defer to police during these early phases can
significantly increase the likelihood of excessive force. 63
Those scholars who focus on the use of excessive force to avert
threats from civilians suggest that officers are not merely (or only)
retaliating against a civilian who refuses to defer. In their view, officers
might well interpret refusal to defer as a signal that the civilian
participant might engage in violence against the officers. That is, patrol
officers see a person who refuses to defer as having "gone rogue";
9

Earlier findings come from DONALD BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF POLICE 170

(1980) (drawing on the "Black-Reiss Data"); Richard E. Sykes & John P. Clark, A Theory of
Deference Exchange in Police-Civilian Encounters, 81 AM. J. SOC. 584, 592-99 (1975); see also
Robert J. Friedrich, Police Use of Force: Individuals, Situations and Organization, 452 ANNALS OF
AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 82, 87-97 (1980); Robert E. Worden & Robin L. Shepard,
Demeanor, Crime and Police Behavior: A Re-examination of the Police Services Study Behavior, 34
CRIMINOLOGY 83, 99-103 (1996). Subsequent empirical research is discussed at infra note 61 and
accompanying text.

6 See Joscha Legewie, Racial Profiling and Use of Force in Police Stops: How Local Events
Trigger Periodsof Increased Discrimination,AM. J. SOC. 8, 1-2 (forthcoming 2016).
" See GORDON P. ALPERT & ROGER DUNHAM, UNDERSTANDING POLICE USE OF FORCE:
OFFICERS, SUSPECTS, AND RECIPROCITY (2004); Joel H. Garner et al., CharacteristicsAssociated

with the Prevalence and Severity of Force Used by the Police, 19 JUST. Q. 705, 719-21, 738-42
(2002); Worden, supra note 7, at 37, 40; Worden & Shepard, supra note 59, at 99-103.
62 Geoffrey P. Alpert & Roger G. Dunham, Analysis of Police Use of Force Data, NCJRS (2000)
(Table II for Springfield/Eugene and Table 3 for Metro Dade).
6
See WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW,
CUSTOM, AND MORALITY 118-33 (1970).
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officers fear the potential danger associated with a person who is
unwilling to abide by the rules. 64
Work by Richard Sykes and John Clark helps to explain the link
between excessive force and defiance. 65 Sykes and Clark propose a
"deference exchange" framework, in which the unit for analysis is the
encounter between officer and civilian, rather than the individual
officer or the law enforcement organization. 66 In an ordinary
interaction, police expect civilians (who have less power and are lower
in social status relative to the officer) to defer to the officer's authority
and to cooperate. But when a civilian refuses to defer, affirmatively
defies authority, or resists an officer, the police often interpret this
action to be evidence that the civilian will not abide by ordinary moral,
legal, and social rules. Officers will frequently conclude that the civilian
does not respect the authority of the law and may pose a danger to the
officer. 67 As Erving Goffman puts it, "to be pointedly refused an
expected act of deference is often a way of being told that open
insurrection has begun."6 8
This interpretation of defiance as a signal of potential future
violence finds support in other research. Work from a range of
disciplines on the so-called "culture of honor" suggests that those
communities or institutions in which interactions are less scripted by
the rule of law (gangs, prisons, the South, ranchers) have developed
rituals of deference because such rituals dampen the potential for
violence. 69 When those rituals are disrupted, community members are
more likely to react with violence, in part as a preemptive act of selfdefense. When an officer perceives that he has lost control of an
encounter, that is, when law is no longer scripting the encounter, the
officer may become more sensitive to challenges to the officer's honor,
and may be more likely to react with force. 70
In this dynamic, racialized perception is key. Police are more likely
to use excessive force when they perceive that civilians are more
resistant, whether or not civilians are actually more resistant. It turns

"

See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 47, 48 (1966).

*

See Sykes & Clark, supranote 59, at 592-99.
See id.

6
67
68

See id.
Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, 58 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 473,

480 (1956).
69 See Ryan P. Brown & Lindsey L. Osterman, Culture of Honor, Violence and Homicide, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES ON VIOLENCE, HOMICIDE AND WAR 225-

28 (Todd K. Shackelford & Viviana A. Weekes-Shackelford eds., 2012).
7o
See Dov Cohen et al., Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: An
Experimental Ethnography, 70 J. OF PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 945, 957-58 (1996).

THE DYNAMICS OF EXCESSIVE FORCE

407]

423

out that race affects whether police interpret defiance and resistance as
a signal of potential violence. Research suggests that police are more
likely to perceive minority civilians as defiant and more likely to
threaten a police officer's well-being or challenge an officer's authority,
particularly when the encounter takes place in a segregated, lowincome, urban neighborhood.7 1 Racial stereotypes about potential
threats are particularly salient when police encounters involve African
American civilians-stereotypes are strongest against African
Americans.7 2 Thus, at the margin, when police are unsure whether
civilians are being disrespectful or resistant, they are more likely to
perceive resistance when the civilian is black.
Race might also affect the possibility of escalation even after an
encounter with a defiant civilian. Recent research finds that police
willingness to use excessive force against resistant civilians spills over
to the days immediately after the encounter, but only for African
American civilians. 73 Joscha Legewie collected data on police
encounters in New York before and after two fatal shootings of a police
officer by a black suspect. 74 Legewie matched the encounters before and
after each shooting, matching for both time of day and location.
Legewie also collected similar matched data before and after the
shooting of a police officer by a Latino perpetrator and then by a white
perpetrator.
Legewie found an increase in police use of force against African
American civilians in the three-day period after the shooting of the
officer. Use of force increased by 16% for one shooting and 13.3% in the
other. Legewie found no similar increase in police use of force against
other civilians. Likewise, he found no increase in police use of force
against any group, white, Latino, or African American, after the
shooting of an officer either by a Latino or white suspect. 75

In conjunction with earlier-cited research, Legewie's study
suggests that under certain conditions, race will determine whether an
officer will use excessive force during encounters, not just with an
African American civilian who is resistant, but also with black civilians
whom they encounter in the days immediately after the index
71

See PAUL CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW
YORK CITY 282-83 (1969);

WESTLEY, supra note 63, at 97-105; Brad W. Smith & Malcolm D. Holmes, Police Use of Excessive
Force in Minority Communities: A Test of the Minority Threat, Place, and Community
Accountability Hypotheses, 61 SOC. PROBLEMS 83, 93-98 (2014).
72

See Allen E. Liska & Jiang Yu, Specifying and Testing the Threat Hypothesis: Police Use of

Deadly Force, in SOCIAL THREAT AND SOCIAL CONTROL 53, 67-68 (Allen E. Liska ed., 1992).
* See Legewie, supra note 60, at 9-10, 19-34.
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encounter. This is so even when civilians in the later encounter are not
resistant.
In sum, evidence supports the idea that when civilians are defiant
or resistant to police authority, officers are more likely at the margin to
use excessive force. Research suggests that black civilians are
particularly at risk for resistance-related excessive force. The next
section documents that when police use excessive force, civilians
become more likely to resist police authority.
2. The correlation between police use of excessive force and citizen
resistance or defiance.
In a separate thread of research, scholars have found that police
use of excessive force affects people's willingness to defer to officer
76
directives or comply with their instructions during an encounter. The
argument here is not that force affects resistance during the same
encounter (although that is also true). Rather, these scholars suggest
that excessive force undermines legitimacy, which in turn makes
civilian deference and cooperation less likely, and civilian resistance or
defiance more likely in future encounters.
Though definitions of legitimacy vary widely, Tom Tyler usefully
defines legitimacy as the condition in which a person (i) accepts the
right of a law enforcement actor to command and to dictate behavior,
and (ii) agrees that she has a corresponding duty to obey.7 7 When police
engage in illegitimate use of excessive force, or when punishment is
delivered unfairly, unjustly, or disproportionately, such action
diminishes legitimacy-it leads to cynicism about the law and a
distrust of police motives. Indeed, use of excessive force is among the
78
strongest predictors of a citizen's view of police legitimacy.
In turn, a person's view of legitimacy of police authority shapes
79
whether they comply with police requests, directives, or commands.
Studies of police encounters in Richmond, Virginia, and a number of
other cities find that legitimacy influences choices by members of the
public about whether to comply with police directives.80 When people
See, e.g., Michael D. Reisig et al., Suspect Disrespect Toward the Police, 21 JUST. Q. 241,
7
262-64 (2004) (elevated levels of police force induce disrespect).
"

See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND

COMPLIANCE 27-31, 45-50 (2006).
See Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young
7
Urban Men's Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 763-74 (2014).
" See id.
8
See Mastrofski et al., Compliance on Demand, supra note 57 at 30; see also John
McCluskey et al., To Acquiesce or Rebel: Predicting Citizen Compliance with Police Requests, 2
POLICE Q. 389, 407-12 (1999).
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believe the police are legitimate, they are more likely to comply with
police directives, and less likely to be defiant or resistant.8 1 Conversely,
when police are not viewed as legitimate, their actions are subject to
challenge, their decisions are not accepted, and their directives are
ignored. 82
Notably, even intrusive police tactics and directives that civilians
view negatively will be more widely tolerated when people trust the
motives that drive police tactics. 83 Scholars document that the loss of
legitimacy that accompanies police use of excessive force contributes to
defiance, anger, and even the persistence of criminal behavior. 84
This increase in the likelihood of defiance can be indirect as well as
direct. Civilians need not have experienced excessive force themselves.
Empirical evidence shows that witnessing or hearing about other
people's interactions with the law and legal authorities can also
engender widespread loss of legitimacy and in turn widespread
resistance.8 5 Moreover, loss of legitimacy and the accompanying
increases in defiance can intensify over time, as resentment
accumulates and becomes amplified. 86 Thus, each incident in which
police use excessive force can be viewed simultaneously as a potential
ground zero event and an intensifier for widespread loss of legitimacy
and increased defiance, depending on how much time has elapsed since
the last such incident.
We can now put together these two threads of research that
document the way that police misconduct shapes civilian resistance,
and the way in which resistance shapes misconduct. Taken together,
this research shows that excessive force escalates over time because of
the positive feedback loop between officer use of force and civilian
refusal to engage in ritual deference toward officers. This paper
suggests that hotspots might be areas in which force and defiance each

8 See TYLER, supra note 77, at 27, 40-56; Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of
Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Public Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC'Y REV. 513, 530
(2003).
82

See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING
PUBLIC COOPERATION

WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 101-11, 121-22 (2002).

See id.
See David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos, Cultural Mechanisms and the Persistenceof
Neighborhood Violence, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1190, 1226-28 (2011); Robert J. Sampson & David J.
Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighbourhood Context of
8
'

Racial Differences, 32 L. & SOC. REV. 777, 793-801 (1998); Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Why Do

Criminals Obey the Law: The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active Gun
Offenders, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 435-38 (2012).
- See JAMES T. TEDESCHI & RICHARD B. FELSON, VIOLENCE, AGGRESSION, & COERCIVE
ACTION 102-111, 354 (1994).
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have ratcheted up in response to the other. On this view, many
departments are vulnerable to the potential evolution of a hotspot
owing to an arms race.
Particularly at risk are those departments in which officers are
more likely to view civilians as refusing to defer, and communities of
color that are subject to repeated police use of excessive force. Race
plays an important amplifying role: race makes officers more likely to
perceive resistance, and thus more likely to use excessive force, which
in turn produces the very resistance the officers are trying to reduce.
IV. CONTAGION: THE SPREAD OF EXCESSIVE FORCE VIA
SOCIAL LEARNING

This section explores the argument that police use of excessive
force is contagious, spreading among officers who are in the same unit,
and increasing the probability that an officer will use excessive force if
he or she has observed others doing so. The research reviewed in this
section suggests that officers will learn to use excessive force by
observing other officers using excessive force, particularly when doing
so brings with it a reward. This section reviews a wide range of
suggestive research: studies on observational learning generally, on
observational learning in criminals, on observational learning in police
officers, and on violence transmission in gang networks. Taken
together, this research supports an argument for the contagious spread
of excessive force among police officers via observational learning.
Research on Observational Learning Generally

A.

In general, recent work on cultural transmission documents that
observational learning-learning from watching other people-plays a
large role in generating human behavior. Indeed, data suggests that
the majority of human behavior is acquired via learning from other
people.8 7 Social learning consists of several different mechanisms to
explain the influence of others on decision making. The most important
of these for our purposes are imitation and sequence learning.
Imitation is a broad category of social learning that involves the
observation and copying of behavior.88 Scholars define imitation as a
" See ROBERT BOYD & PETE RICHERSON, CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 83-94
(1985); LUIGI LUCA CAVALLI-SFORZA & MARCUS W. FELDMAN, CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND
EVOLUTION: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 6-9, 63 (1981); Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza & Marcus W.

Feldman, Cultural Versus Genetic Adaptation, 80 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 4993, 4995 (1983). For a
more general review of social learning, see RONALD L. AKERS, SOCIAL LEARNING AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE (2009); ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY (1977).

"

See Thomas Zentall, Imitation:Definitions, Evidence and Mechanisms, 9 ANIM. COGN. 335,
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category of processes that make it more likely for someone to engage in
a behavior after she observes the behavior than if she does not observe
the behavior. 89 Researchers have focused their lens on a particular kind
of imitation called "sequence learning," in which people learn to
perform complex behavior by observing a sequence of acts, skills or
tasks. 90
In their description of sequence learning, Richard Byrne and Anne
Russon distinguish between copying the "surface behavior" detail of a
sequence of behavior, which they call "action-level" imitation, and
copying the hierarchical organization of the sequence, which they call
"program-level" imitation.9 1 They define the "program level" to be the
hierarchical organization of a program into a modifiable structure of
goals and sub-goals. 92 For example, food preparation (for gorillas or
humans) can be divided into a sequence of separate goals: find, collect,
clean, and fold vegetation, etc., and then each of these goals can be
divided into separate tasks, like strip the stem and tear off the leaves
for the goal of cleaning the vegetation. Byrne and Russon compare
these hierarchically organized sequences to computer programs with
routines, subroutines, and individual lines of code. 93
Program-level sequence learning consists of copying the structural
organization of the behavior-the goals, their sequence, and even the
subroutine structure-while allowing for individual independent (nonsocial) learning at the most detailed sub-hierarchical level. So in the
above example, individuals learn by observing the sequence of goals of
finding, collecting, cleaning, and folding, but they learn independently,'
perhaps through trial and error, how to strip the stem or tear off the
petioles when collecting vegetation. In comparison, action-level
sequence learning would include identical behavior in stripping or
tearing off petioles. 94
What is important about program-level sequence learning for our
purposes is that it exhibits variation at the most granular level, even as
imitative copying takes place at a higher level. Individuals who possess
cognitive complexity can imitate the overall form or the sequence of
goals, while subroutines or sub-goals at a finer level can be acquired by

335-38 (2006).
81 Id.; see also Richard W. Byrne & Anne E. Russon, Learning
by Imitation: A Hierarchical
Approach, 21 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIENCES 667, 670 (1998).
9
See id. at 715.
9'
92
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See id. at 715-16.
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trial and error. 95 According to the research, the ability to imitate
sequences at the program-level requires complex cognitive function and
thinking in the abstract. 96
This research suggests that even if behavior is not copied
identically, people can learn the broad outlines of how to accomplish a
particular task by observing one another. Police officers, for example,
may observationally learn the broad program-level outline of how to
use excessive force to control a resistant civilian, even if they do not
precisely imitate particular tasks. As the following section suggests,
program-level learning features heavily in observational learning
among criminals.
Research on Learning in Criminals

B.

Over the last several decades, scholars have developed the general
argument that crime and deviance are shaped by peer influence and
group processes. 97 Research suggests that criminals learn particular
sequences of behaviors or scripts from each other when they commit
crimes. 98 Consistent with the concepts of program-level learning,
criminals use both general scripts (e.g., "theft" scripts) and more
specific sub-track scripts ("car theft" scripts). 99
In a car theft script, for example, the criminal carries out a
sequence of sub-tasks: prepare for the crime by choosing tools, select a
particular car, carry out the theft by hot-wiring the ignition, sell the
stolen vehicle to an overseas exporter.1 00 Over time, these sub-tasks
become part of a regular course of behavior; the script becomes a
psychological shortcut that the criminal accesses when committing the
crime. Importantly, although scripts consist of fairly regular component
behaviors or prescribed steps, like program-level learning, scripts in
script theory also allow for a fair amount of flexible adaptation. 10 1

" See Richard W. Byrne & Jennifer M. E. Byrne, Hand Preferences in the Skilled Gathering
Tasks of Mountain Gorillas (Gorillag. beringei), 27 CORTEX 521, 540-44 (1991); Richard W. Byrne
& Jennifer M. E. Byrne, Complex Leaf- Gathering Tasks of Mountain Gorillas (Gorillag. beringei):
Variability and Standardization, 31 AM. J. PRIMATOLOGY 241, 257-59 (1991).
9
See Byrne & Russon, supra note 89, at 709; see also L. Rowell Huesmann & Lucyna Kirwil,
Why Observing Violence Increases the Risk of Violent Behavior by the Observer, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK 545, 564-65 (Daniel Flannery et al. eds., 2007).
9
See supra note 11.

" See generally RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 32-42 (1980).

9
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L. Rowell Huesmann and Lucyna Kirwil suggest that a range of
contextual facts affect criminals' observational learning of scripts. Most
importantly, positive reinforcement-when the behavior is followed by
a reward for the model (and/or for the observer as well)-makes
observational learning more likely:
According to observational-learning theory, the likelihood that
an individual will acquire an observed social script is increased
when the model performing the script is similar to or attractive
to the viewer, the viewer identifies with the model, the context
is realistic, and the viewed behavior is followed by rewarding
consequences. 102
This research suggests that if a police officer observes another
officer using excessive force and obtaining a positive reward-say,
approval by the officers' colleagues or the reward of reducing risk by
shortening the duration of an encounter with a resistant civilian-they
are more likely to copy the use of excessive force. Using excessive force
produces perhaps its highest payoff in averting a potential threat.1 03
Thus, in uncertainty, officers may be like criminals in that they are
more likely to use strategies that involve excessive force if those
strategies produce high payoffs. This is particularly true if officers
observe that those officers who use excessive force receive no
punishment or disapproval from others. 104 Indeed, the next section
suggests that police officers are likely to display the same kinds of
observational learning of violence and wrongdoing that criminals
display.
C.

Research on Observational Learning by Police Officers

Generally speaking, police officers exert a great deal of influence on
each other. Gordon Alpert and Roger Dunham find that peer influence
is a central pressure operating within police units.105 Police officers are
"subjected to intense peer influence and control," 106 and peer influence

102
1

Huesmann & Kirwil, supra note 96, at 551 (citing BANDURA, supra note 11).
See Legewie, supra note 60, at 8.

For example, in 2008, experts estimated the odds that Chicago police
would be disciplined
for filed complaints alleging misconduct at 2 in 1000. Scholars noted that the odds of discipline are
actually lower because so few civilians actually file complaints in response to police brutality. See
Craig B. Futterman et al., The Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and
Disciplinary Practices: The Chicago Police Department's Broken System, 1 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST.
251, 257 (2008).
104

105
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See ALPERT & DUNHAM, UNDERSTANDING POLICE USE OF FORCE,
supra note 61.
See KAPPELER ET AL., supra note 49.
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induces individual officers to adopt the beliefs and definitions of fellow
officers. 107
Research on observational learning suggests that officers who
witness other officers use excessive force are more likely to use
excessive force in the future in similar settings.1 0 8 In particular, officers
are likely to copy particular scripted strategies and behaviors involving
the use of excessive force against defiant or resistant civilians.1 09 So for
example, if an officer observes another officer using a Taser or a baton
on a civilian who was verbally disrespectful, the observing officer
becomes more likely to use that strategy in a future encounter.
Other research on police behavior during protests suggests that
these scripts of violence can diffuse widely in a police officer population.
In a study of the policing of global justice protest movements, Donatella
Della Porta and Sydney Tarrow charted the evolution and diffusion of
specific types of force tactics by police in their battle against an
increasingly organized and innovative protest movement. 110 As protests
spread from Seattle to Gothenburg to Genoa, protesters began to adopt
new forms of protest designed to evade suppression by police. For
example, when confronted with officers who infiltrated crowds to make
arrests, protestors began using masked street formations and
blockading. In response, police then began to deploy heavy anti-riot
gear, mobilizing special coercive units in advance of their intervention,
using force to temporarily incapacitate protestors, and then pushing
them outside the boundaries of the relevant geographic zones."
Della Porta and Tarrow traced the diffusion patterns of these
discrete and identifiable tactics as they diffused from city to city and
from unit to unit, likely via observational sequence learning. In
addition to informal sharing of information, officers from other cities
11 2
were transported to new cities to experiment with joint intervention.

See SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, supra note 64, at 249; Allison T. Chappell & Alex
R. Piquero, Applying Social Learning Theory to Police Misconduct, 25 DEVIANT BEHAV. 89, 99-104
(2004).
See ALPERT & DUNHAM, UNDERSTANDING POLICE USE OF FORCE, supra note 61.
10s
107

See id.
n0 See Della Porta & Tarrow, supra note 58; see also John D. McCarthy et al., The Diffusion
109

and Adoption of Public Order Management Systems, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN A GLOBALIZING

WORLD 71, 71-93 (Donatella Della Porta et al. eds., 1999) (tracing diffusion of policing
institutional practices in response to protest innovation).
".. See Della Porta & Tarrow, supra note 58, at 21.
"2 See id. at 19-20; Herbert Reiter & Olivier Fillieule, Formalizing the Informal: The EU
Approach to Transnational Protest Policing, in POLICING TRANSNATIONAL PROTEST: IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE "BATTLE OF SEATTLE" 145 (Donatella Della Porta et al. eds., 2006) (tracing

diffusion of post-9/1 1 protest police tactics of escalation and restriction of movement).

407]

THE DYNAMICS OFEXCESSIVE FORCE

431

This evidence suggests the possibility that police officers were learning
at the program-level observationally, by watching and then doing.
Closer to home, research on police in the United States confirms
that scripts and strategies likely diffuse via social learning from officer
to officer. Jeffrey Fagan and Amanda Geller have studied diffusion in
police departments of what they call "scripts of suspicion," deployed by
police officers who are carrying out Terry stops. 11 3 In this study, Fagan
and Geller tracked the diffusion of rationales used to justify a Terry
stop in follow-up administrative reporting. Departments asked officers
to fill out a form after such a stop, and in particular, to choose from a
menu of possible factors justifying the stop.
As Fagan and Geller noted, over the period of the study (2004-12),
officers in the same unit began to list the same factors to justify a stop,
abandoning some factors and increasing their use of others. For
example, from 2004 to 2011, the selection rate for the "furtive
movements" factor rose from forty percent to sixty percent, while three
or four other factors declined in selection until their use became
negligible. In particular, two of the "other" factors (in which officers
were invited to detail factors that were not listed) declined in use, at
the same time that the average number of listed factors increased
thirty percent. In sum, officers' factor selection became more similar in
complex patterned ways over time. 114 Although the authors did not
investigate whether the factors used by the officers were more
successful in defeating any challenges to the stop, we can assume that
such positive reinforcement would play an important role in the
learning process.
D.

Research on Violence Transmission in Gang Networks

The hypothesis that excessive force is contagious among police
officers in a network gains support from recent research suggesting
that violence may be contagious among gang members in the same
network.1 15 Gang violence in particular is very much shaped by peer
influence, and recent research documents the clustering of violence
(homicides, fatal gunshot, and nonfatal-gunshot injury) among social
networks in gangs. 116

"
See Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry
Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 51-87 (2003).
114
See id. at 73.
"5 Early work by Colin Loftin suggested that violence among gang members was "subcultural"
and could be transmitted by contagion. See Colin Loftin, Assaultive Violence as a Contagious
Social Process, 62 BULL. N.Y. AcAD. MED. 550 (1986).
"' See Andrew V. Papachristos, Murder by Structure: Dominance Relations and the Social
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Research on social learning theory and gangs is mixed. Some
scholars rely heavily on relatively outdated models of social learning
that emphasize "differential association"-a theory that focuses not just
on the learning of behavior among gang members but also on the drives
and motivations to comply with law, and the incorporation of such
117
More
motives into the individual's social psychological makeup.
modern quantitative scholarship on the social network analysis of gang
activity focuses on the structural relationships among gang members
and the clustering of criminal activity that is correlated to such
structural connections.
Work by Andrew Papachristos in collaboration with others has
demonstrated that the placement of a gang member in a social network
can determine his risk of violence. Papachristos and his team use social
network analysis and incident level homicide reports to recreate the
structure of gang violence in Chicago. Their research shows that tit-fortat reciprocal murders between gangs are more likely when
perpetrating gangs have had prior network contact involving murder
118
Likewise,
with victim gangs in their "conflict network" in the past.
that the
demonstrated
Papachristos and his collaborators have
probability of being a gunshot victim is correlated to past exposure to
11 9
gunshot injury of fellow network members.
Such work suggests that the diffusion of police strategies of
excessive force via social learning is likely to take place along social and
professional networks. Like gang members, police officers are connected
to each other via a range of both formal and informal networks. Formal
organizational networks channel responsibility, communication, and
accountability via formal organizational hierarchy and network
structures. 120 Officers in the same unit are likely to observe one another
with great regularity. Thus, these formal network relationships are
likely to serve as vectors to facilitate the spread of excessive force.
In addition, research suggests that informal connections among
officers might be the key vectors along which violence gets transmitted.
Informal networks are not always visible from the formal

Structure of Gang Homicide, 115 AM. J. Soc. 74, 115-18 (2009); Papchristos et al., The Corner and
the Crew, supra note at 12, at 438-39; Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Tragic but Not Random: The
Social Contagion of Norifatal Gunshot Injury, 125 SOc. SCI. & MED. 139, 147-48 (2015).
.. See L. Thomas Winfree, Jr. & Adrienne Freng, Gangs and Social Learning Theory: What
We Know, What We Need to Know, and Why It Matters, in THE HANDBOOK OF GANGS (Scott H.
Decker & David C. Pyrooz eds., 2015).
" Papachristos et al., Murder by Structure, supra note 116, at 111.
n9 Papachristos et al., Tragic but Not Random, supra note 116.
120
See Robert J. Houghton et al., Command and Control in Emergency Services Operations:A
Social Network Analysis, 49 ERGONOMICS 1204 (2006).
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organizational structure of responder units. Often, units that appear
separate in an organizational diagram work together on an informal
basis. In a social network analysis of emergency responders, for
example, Robert J. Houghton et al. mapped the informal network
relationships of three separate police and fire department encounters
during an emergency response. For police, the group studied two car
break-ins and a mobile phone robbery. Researchers found that police
response exhibited a "split network" topography, in which a central log
unit recorded the incoming request, and then active policing was
divided into separate networks (a group initiating an investigation and
a group to treat injured parties, for example) with communication
shared between them. Importantly, network members were not
necessarily part of the same formal network or unit. 121 Thus, in any
social network analysis of excessive force, we would need to map these
informal network connections as well as the more formal ones.
E.

Network Transmission of Excessive Force

Taken together, the foregoing research suggests that excessive
force is likely to diffuse among police officers who are connected to each
other by network ties. This paper argues that excessive force likely
spreads because police learn how and when to use excessive force
against defiant civilians observationally, by watching other officers.
Observational learning plays a key role in much social behavior; people
often learn at the program-level to follow scripts of behavior from' one
another. Criminals learn to commit crimes by observing others whoare
using these scripts of illegal behavior. Officers often learn policing
strategies informally from one another as well. Existing research on
social network analysis in gangs suggests that police officers may well
become infected by the use of excessive force in the same way that gang
members become infected by exposure to violence from members of
their network.
V. CONCLUSION
Each of the foregoing dynamics potentially helps to explain the
reproduction of excessive force. Part III of this paper argued that
excessive force escalates and spreads because excessive force generates
increased resistance and defiance in civilians, and in turn, resistance
and defiance are correlated to the increased likelihood that police will
use excessive force. Part IV argued that the practice spreads through
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See id.
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social learning along informal and formal social and professional
networks in police organizations.
Where other accounts have focused on individual officer or
individual department attributes, this account focuses on the social
production of violence, and in particular, on the interaction among
officers and the interaction between officers and civilians. Mapping the
contagion and escalation of force could potentially help to explain why
some units or sub-units of police departments become hotspots of
excessive force while others do not. Empirical research is needed to
determine how much of observable excessive force events might
plausibly be traced to originating events and how much to contagion
among officers and an arms race between officers and civilians.
In research currently underway, we extend the above analysis to
test our model against available data. To theoretically map the
contagion of excessive force among officers, we develop a simple "selfexciting point process" mathematical model, a modeling approach used
to model contagion in epidemiology, financial contagion, and
earthquakes. This point process model describes the spread of excessive
force in probabilistic terms. The likelihood that a particular officer will
use excessive force in a particular encounter depends on two variables:
probability that the index officer will
(i) the "background"
spontaneously use excessive force without having been influenced by
other officers; and (ii) the sum of social influence-the increased
probability of using excessive force after observing another officer do
so-over all observations by the index officer of other officers who have
used excessive force at an earlier time. The influence that observing
another officer has on the index officer in turn depends on the officer's
"susceptibility" and the length of time that has elapsed since the
122
observation, as the effect fades with time.
We are currently testing this model against longitudinal citizen
123
The CPD
complaint data from the Chicago Police Department (CPD).
lodged
complaints
of
citizen
the
form
in
data"
data contains "outbreak
against officers for the use of excessive force, from 2002 to 2015.124 The
complaints include the date of the incident and the officer accused.

122
See Daria Roithmayr et al., The Dynamic Spread of Police Misconduct (forthcoming) (on file
with author) (using a self-exciting point process "Hawkes" model to analyze the spread of various
categories of police misconduct (including excessive force) in the Chicago Police Department); see
also Daria Roithmayr & Julia Neagu, Contagious Excessive Force (forthcoming) (on file with
author) (using a disease model to analyze the spread of excessive force in the Chicago Police
Department).
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Importantly, the data also includes a record of co-offending police
officers and observing witness police officers, as well as the sequence of
events as narrated by the complainant. Finally, additional data allow
us to reconstruct complete formal institutional networks of officers by
using officer unit assignments for all officers employed by CPD between
2002 and 2015, the years covered by the database. 125
Such data may potentially enable us to trace the spread of
excessive force from officer to officer. Modern techniques permit us to
map the spread of excessive force by reconstructing "transmission
trees" and estimating key parameters via Markov Chain Monte Carlo
sampling. Preliminary results from network research on a wider range
of complaints beyond excessive force already have identified small
clusters of networked officers who are the subject of a significant
number of citizen complaints. These results suggest that like gangs,
police units may very well function to transmit the spread of illegal
violence among network members.
To validate the argument that a feedback loop generates mutually
escalating excessive force and civilian resistance, we develop a simple
mathematical model of an arms race between civilians and officers. In
this model, civilians respond to the use of excessive force by increasing
their level of collective resistance to police directives, with some
probability. In turn, officers respond to resistance by collectively
increasing the use of excessive force, with some probability. This model
resembles the standard arms race model found in political science
literature.
To test the arms race model against our CPD data, we draw from
two categories of data. To assess levels of civilian resistance, we use the
city data on civilian "inference with a public officer," which includes
resisting or fleeing arrest, and refusal to cooperate with an officer. 126 To
assess levels of police use of excessive force, we use the frequency of
citizen complaint data described above. 127
The potential impact of our research is significant. Our analysis
could reframe the way we understand excessive force. Understanding
individuals as they are located in collective social networks and social
relationships, and the way in which those relationships (and individual
behavior in turn) change over time, is essential to explaining the how
and why of excessive force. This project constructs violence as social
and relational.
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A focus on social influence has begun to pervade the study of gang
violence in the United States. This paper has argued that social
influence and patterns of collective violence ought to be studied in
police units to understand the evolutionary dynamics of excessive force.
Although there are very important differences between gangs and
police units, there is much to be learned from using these methods to
study those who police as well as those who are policed. Mapping the
dynamics of interaction among officers and between officers and
civilians may help policymakers to fully understand the emergence of
excessive force, to quantify the risk factors that determine an officer's
susceptibility to escalation and contagion, and to inoculate officers and
units against the spread of illegal violence.

